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The Whitman administration’s 30% reduction in New Jersey’s personal income taxes
from1994to1996isprominentlycitedasarolemodelforstatefiscalpolicy.Theauthors
investigatewhetherthegrowthbenefitsattributedtotheWhitmantaxcutsarewarranted.
Panel data methods are applied to annual observations of county-level employment
growthfromNewJerseyandthesurroundingeconomicregion.Thisstudy’sanalysisdoes
notsupportthehypothesisthattaxcutsstimulatedemploymentgrowthinNewJersey.Al-
thoughNew Jersey did experience substantialemploymentgrowth subsequentto the tax
cuts, most of this growth was shared by the nearby Economic Areas.
Keywords: income tax; tax cuts; state fiscal policy; New Jersey; employment growth
State fiscal policy follows a distinct cyclical pattern. Although tax
increasesareatypicalresponsetobudgetshortfalls(oftenrequiredby
balancedbudgetlegislation),taxcutsareofferedasaneconomicstim-
ulant. Academic research, however, offers little guidance regarding
such tax policy decisions.
Economictheoryoffersarangeofmodelsregardingthegrowthim-
pacts of changes in state fiscal policy. Tax cuts could stimulate eco-
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269nomic growth by altering incentives to save, invest, and participate in
theworkforce.Taxcuts,however,maybecoupledwithchangesinex-
penditures. Boththedistortionary natureofthetaxscheme,aswellas
the productive nature of public spending, affect overall growth out-
comes.Inaddition,tax-mimickingbehaviorcanmitigatethepotential
stimulative effects of reducing a state’s tax burden (Besley and Case
1995; Case 1993). Of course, if state economic growth is exogenous,
then tax policy changes will not affect long-run economic growth.
The empirical literature does not clarify the relationship between
statetaxpolicychangesandeconomicgrowth.
1Somesurveyssuggest
that state tax cuts have a positive, but very modest, impact on eco-
nomic development (Bartik 1991; Phillips and Gross 1995;
Wasylenko 1997). Several prominent studies conclude that state tax
cuts paid for by reduced spending on public services—as opposed to
transfer payments—have a negative impact on economic develop-
ment(Helms1985;MofidiandStone1990;Bartik1991;Tannenwald
1996; Lynch 1996).
2 To the extent a consensus exists, it is that previ-
ous results should be viewed as unreliable and uncertain.
3
Severalestimationproblems,includingmisspecification,measure-
ment error of key policy variables, and endogeneity of tax changes,
contribute to the unreliability of the academic literature (Carroll and
Wasylenko1994; Phillips andGross1995; Becsi1996). Endogeneity
arises because states tend to raise (lower) taxes in poor (good) eco-
nomic times. To resolve the inherent estimation problems, Poot
(2000)andothershavecalledforstudiesthat“relyonnatural‘experi-
ments’—studiesthatobservehowsimilarlocaleconomies...respond
to large, exogenous changes in tax regimes” (Bartik 1997, 68).
Notably, the promoters of tax-cutting policies base their recom-
mendations primarily on individual state experiences. A prominently
mentioned “role model” is the New Jersey experience under the lead-
ership of Governor Christine Todd Whitman (Garfield 1996; Moore
and Stansel 1996). Whitman spearheaded a cumulative 30% reduc-
tion in state personal income tax from 1994 to 1996. Reviewing state
taxchangessincethelate1960s,weconcludethatNewJerseyoffersa
rare case of a tax-cutting policy resembling a “natural experiment”
with a large, exogenous tax cut.
4
270 PUBLIC FINANCE REVIEWOurstudyinvestigateswhetherthegrowthbenefitsattributedtothe
Whitmantaxcutsarewarranted.Unliketypicalstudiesofstatetaxim-
pacts, our analysis applies panel data methods to county-level (rather
than state-level) data for New Jersey and the surrounding economic
region.
5Followinganeventstudyformat,impactsaremeasuredusing
annual observations of employment growth before and after the re-
spective tax cuts. Our results suggest that undue credit is attributed to
the Whitman tax cuts. Although New Jersey did experience substan-
tial growth in the time period coinciding with the tax cuts, the adjoin-
ingregion sharedmostofthisgrowth.Theresidualgrowthspecificto
New Jersey is not statistically significant.
BACKGROUND ON THE
1994-1996 NEW JERSEY TAX CUTS
Therecessionoftheearly1990s resultedinsignificantstatetaxin-
creases across the country. As the economy was beginning to recover
from the recession, tax relief, fiscal responsibility, and smaller gov-
ernment were common themes in the campaign platforms. The ubiq-
uity of voter discontent was evident from the 1994 national elections
results. In Congress, voters elected a Republican majority to the






unique even for a new governor.
7 Whitman distinguished herself by
publicly announcing a very specific, tax-cutting plan long before she
was elected to office. In her 1993 gubernatorial campaign, Whitman
heavily emphasized her ambitious plan to reduce personal income
taxes across the board by 10% each of her first 3 years in office.
8 Not
drivenbybudgetsurpluses,Whitman’staxplanwaswidelycriticized
by those who feared it would lead to massive deficits (Mullaney
1994). Subsequent to being elected, Governor Whitman immediately
moved to have her tax plan implemented as promised. Whitman is
Reed, Rogers / TAX CUTS, EMPLOYMENT GROWTH IN NEW JERSEY 271widely credited with being the primary political orchestrator of the
New Jersey tax cuts.
TheWhitmantaxcutsrepresentasignificantdeparturefromthetax
regimes of the other states in the Mideast region faced with similar
economic forces.
9 As confirmed in Table 1, New Jersey’s tax cuts
cameprimarilyfromreductionsinthepersonalincometax.Theresult
of the New Jersey tax cuts was a cumulative, 30% reduction in New
Jersey’spersonalincometaxformoststateresidents,phasedinovera
3-year period from 1994 to 1996. The other states in the Mideast re-
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TABLE 1: Summary of Nature and Estimated Size of Tax Changes:New Jersey,
1994-1996
Estimated Impact Compared to
Absence of Policy Change
a
FY 94 FY 95 FY 96 FY 97
Public laws of 1994
Change 2: Gross income tax cut for
1994 liability $52 $298 $263 $303
Change 3: Removal of 0.375% corporate
business tax (CBT) surtax $2 $38 $38 $38
Change 8: Increase in the income tax filing
threshold $28 $28 $28
Change 69: Gross income tax cut for
1995 liability $131 $318 $362
1994 subtotal $54 $495 $647 $731
Public laws of 1995
Change 165: Gross income tax cut for
1996 liability $222 $540
Changes 184, 245, 246, and 317: Elimination
of sales tax on Yellow Pages advertising;
revision of CBT apportionment formula;
reduction in CBT rate; sales tax exemption
for broadcast equipment $9 $48
1995 subtotal $231 $588
Public laws of 1996
Change 60: Introduction of income tax
deduction for property taxes $100
1996 subtotal $100
Cumulative size of tax changes $54 $495 $878 $1,419
SOURCE:OfficeofTaxAnalysis,DepartmentofTreasury,StateofNewJersey(1998).
a.  The unit of measurement for the estimated impacts is millions of dollars.gion also enacted some reductions in personal and corporate income
taxes from 1994 to 1997.
10 As Gold (1996) emphasizes, however,
measuring the size of tax changes is notoriously difficult. This makes
cross-state comparisons problematic.
Table 2 reports the National Conference of State Legislatures
(NCSL) estimates of revenue impacts among the Mideast region
states using two alternative accounting methods: the baseline and the







“major” tax changes in 3 consecutive years.
12
The baseline estimates, however, are subject to criticism. Under




the previous year. From 1990 through 1994, New York postponed re-
ductionsinpersonalincometaxesthathadbeenscheduledtooccurin
previous legislation. According to the baseline (but not the tax liabil-
ity) method, these postponements are counted as tax increases. In ad-
dition, the baseline method only measures changes in the first fiscal
year for which the legislation is implemented, understating the effect
of multiyear tax cut legislation. Both New Jersey and New York had
multiyear tax cut legislation during the period.
The lower section of Table 2 uses the tax liability method to calcu-
laterevenueimpactsforthecalendaryears1994-1997.
13Theleft-hand
side of the table reports the fiscal years during which the tax changes
had their impact, as opposed to when the tax legislation was enacted.
Using this method, it appears that both NewJersey and NewYork en-
actedsignificanttaxcutsduringthe1994-1997fiscalyearperiod.The
bigdifferencebetweenNewJerseyandNewYorkliesinthetimingof
their respective tax cuts. The Whitman tax cuts were concentrated in
thebeginningofthe1994-1997period,whereastheNewYorktaxcuts
were concentrated at the end of this period.
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.Our background investigation supports two essential claims about
the New Jersey tax cuts. First, like a “natural experiment,” they were
instituted independently of factors specific to the state’s economic
growth. Second, they represented a significant departure from the tax
regimes of states in the same economic region. New Jersey’s tax cuts
were substantially larger and more frequent than those in the rest of
theMideastregion,withthepossibleexceptionofNewYork.Thesub-
sequent empirical analysis addresses this ambiguity by including
regression specifications that separate out New York.
ESTIMATION
Given the estimation problems identified above, we employ an
“event study” framework to estimate the effects of the 1994-1996
NewJerseytaxcuts.
14Essentially,thisapproachconsistsofa“before-
after” comparison of New Jersey’s employment growth. For the “be-
fore” period, we choose 1989 to 1993. Employment growth during
this period is compared with the period 1994-1997, which captures
the cumulative effects of the 3-year period of tax cuts. We condition
this comparison on employment growth in neighboring geographical
areas, so that our approach may also be thought of as a variation of
“difference in differences.”
The Whitman tax cuts attracted attention given the size of the tax
cuts and the subsequent robust economic growth. We define employ-
























As shown in Table 3, the years immediately preceding the Whitman
tax cuts (1989-1993) were characterized by poor employment
growth.
15 Employment declined in the years 1990 through 1992, with
modestannualemploymentgrowthof0.72%in1993.Thefirstyearof
the multiyear tax cut (1994) was also characterized by a modest em-
ploymentgainof0.97%. Itwasfollowedby3subsequent yearsofro-
bust growth of 1.54%, 1.27%, and 2.14% a year.
Reed, Rogers / TAX CUTS, EMPLOYMENT GROWTH IN NEW JERSEY 275An ordinary least squares (OLS) estimate of employment growth
indicates that New Jersey’s annual employment growth rate was 1.50
percentage points greater in the tax cut period 1994-1997 compared
with the pre–tax cut period.
16 When a county-level analogue is esti-
matedusingobservationsofemploymentgrowthinthe21NewJersey
counties and county-fixed effects, we find that New Jersey’s counties
grewatanannualratethatwas1.72percentagepointshigherinthetax
cut years compared to the pre–tax cut years.
17
It is not clear that New Jersey’s robust employment growth in the
taxcutyearsdifferedfromthatoftheregionaleconomy.Giventhatre-
gional economic shocks can play important roles in explaining eco-
nomic growth differentials, we consider alternative geographic area
definitions.
18 Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) “Economic Re-
gions” are defined by grouping states according to commonality of
economic activity. In contrast, BEA “Economic Areas” group coun-
tiesaccordingtotheirdegreeofeconomicinterrelatedness,asdefined
by commuting patterns. They consist of
oneormoreeconomicnodes—metropolitanareasorsimilarareasthat
serve as centers of economic activity—and the surrounding counties
that are economically related to the nodes. (Johnson 1995, 75)
For the purposes of this study, Economic Areas are preferable to
Economic Regions because counties from closely related economic
areasaremorelikelytoshareacommon,regionalshockthancounties
276 PUBLIC FINANCE REVIEW





























1 100.located within the same Economic Region but different Economic
Areas.
We define three relevant economic regions. The first region, the
BEAMideastregion,isshowninFigure1A.AsrepresentedinFigure
1B,thesecondregionconsistsoftheBEAEconomicAreasthateither
directly contain New Jersey counties, or are contiguous to Economic
Areasthatdo,orEconomicAreas10,11,12,13,and14.Thethirdand
narrowest region includes the two Economic Areas that directly con-
tainNewJerseycounties(EconomicAreas10and12).Table4reports
theallocationofcountiesacrossstatesaccordingtoalternativedefini-
tions of economic region. Notably, the economic regions defined us-
ing BEA Economic Areas draw the great majority of their counties
fromtheMideastregion.Asaresult,ourearlierconclusionsaboutthe
uniqueness of New Jersey’s tax cuts relative to the region remain
applicable when using these latter two regional definitions.
Weconstructapanelofobservationsforeachofoursetsofcounties
and estimate the fixed-effect model,
EMPGTit = αi + β TAXCUTit + γ POST93t + εit, εit ~ N(0, σ
2), (2)
where i =1 ,2 ,... ,N; t = 1989,1990, . . ., 1997; αi is acounty-specific
fixedeffect;TAXCUTisadummyvariablethattakesthevalue1ifthe
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TABLE 4: Distribution of Counties Across Alternative Economic Region
Definitions
BEA Mideast BEA Economic BEA Economic
State Region Areas 10-14
a Areas 10 and 12
a
Connecticut — 8 8
Delaware 3 3 2
Maryland 24 24 1
Massachusetts 4 4
New Jersey 21 21 21
New York 62 14 14
Pennsylvania 67 34 25
Vermont — 1 1
Virginia — 22 —
West Virginia — 9 —
Total number of counties 177 140 76
Total number of observations 1,593 1,260 684
a.  BureauofEconomicAnalysis(BEA)EconomicAreasarelistedinJohnson(1995).observation belongs to New Jersey during the years 1994-1997; and
POST93 is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 during the years
1994-1997 and applies to all counties. Note that the total number of
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Figure 1: GeographicArea Definedby Bureau of EconomicAnalysis (BEA) Mid-
east Region (A) and Economic Areas 10 to 14 (B)
B
Acounties is given by N = N1 + N2 +...+NS, where Ns is the number of
counties in state s, and S is the number of states.
19
Thedummyvariable,TAXCUT,isusedtomodelthechangeinNew
Jersey’s tax regime, à la a typical difference-in-difference approach.
This approach is warranted given the practical difficulties in measur-
ing the size of tax changes.
20 In addition to the problems discussed in







estimates of the size of the tax cuts are calculated for fiscal years,
whereas economic growth data, such as employment, are measured
for calendar years. Consequently, a straightforward mapping of
quantitative measures of tax cuts to economic growth data is not
practical.
Rows 2 through 4 of Table 5 report the results of estimating equa-
tion (2) with OLS. Note that the sum of the coefficients for TAXCUT
and POST93 equals the previous estimate of POST93 in row 1 that
was attained using just the New Jersey counties. In other words, the
original coefficient for POST93 is decomposed into a regional-spe-
cific component (POST93) and the New Jersey–specific component
(TAXCUT).ThecoefficientontheTAXCUTvariableidentifiesthere-
sidual growth that remains after correcting for contemporaneous
regional growth.
The OLS results suggest that much of New Jersey’s growth during
thetaxcutyearswassharedbycountiesinthesurroundingregion.For
example,focusingfirstonrow2,weestimatethatannualemployment
growth for all counties in the Mideast region was 0.896 percentage
points larger in 1994-1997 than it was in 1989-1993. The estimated
TAXCUT coefficient indicates that annual employment growth in
New Jersey’s counties during the tax cut years was 0.821 percentage
pointsmorethanwhatcouldhavebeenexpectedfromregionalgrowth
alone.
The estimated tax impact decreases substantially if we define the
relevant region as Economic Areas 10 to 14. Including a region-spe-
cific growth component reduces the coefficient on TAXCUT to 0.389
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.(row 3), a substantial reduction. Based on the associated t value of
1.20,thehypothesisofnoincreasedgrowthcannotberejectedatcon-
ventional significance levels. The results are similar when the defini-
tionofregionisnarrowedtothoseBEAEconomicAreasthatdirectly
contain New Jersey counties (Economic Areas 10 and 12). For this
case, a TAXCUT coefficient of 0.424 is estimated (row 4). Although
the associated standard error is somewhat smaller than the previous
case, the coefficient is still insignificant at the 10% level.
It is not surprising that the results are sensitive to the regional defi-
nition used in the analysis. BEA Economic Regions are broad groups
of states with a commonality of economic activity. In contrast, Eco-
nomicAreasareconstructedtomorecarefullyidentifyareaslinkedby
functional ties. Thus, estimates associated with Economic Areas are
likely to be the most reliable measures of tax cut effects.
23
The estimatespresented in this section highlight the importance of
accounting for overall regional growth and the sensitivity of the esti-
matedimpactstotheregionaldefinition.Thenextsectioninvestigates
anumberofissuesthatmayleadtobetterestimates,includingwithin-
state correlation, heteroscedasticity, and autocorrelation.
ESTIMATION REFINEMENTS
Although contributing additional information and leading to more
precise confidence intervals, the use of county-level data to analyze
state-level policies potentially violates the assumption of independ-
enceacrossobservations.Inotherwords,itwouldbewrongtoassume
that the 21 counties of New Jersey represent 21 independent “natural
experiments” of the impact of tax policy on economic growth.
Moulton (1990,p.334)demonstratesthat“evensmalllevelsofcorre-
lation [e.g., across counties within a state] can cause the standard er-
rors from ordinary leastsquaresto be seriously biased downward.”In
addition, the panel nature of the data suggests that both groupwise
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation may be present, causing OLS
to be inefficient and its standard errors to be biased.
Let  ~ N(0, V), where  is the vector of error terms from equation
(2) above. The combination of within-state correlation, groupwise
Reed, Rogers / TAX CUTS, EMPLOYMENT GROWTH IN NEW JERSEY 281(state-level) heteroscedasticity, and first-order autocorrelation pro-
duces a covariance matrix V defined by































































































      
… ×T
,
and where ρs is the correlation of the error terms between counties
from the same state s,σ s
2 is the variance of the error term for counties
(observations) from state s, and ρ is a common AR(1) parameter, as-
sumingthattheobservationsareorderedfirstbystate,thenbycounty,
and then by time. This model is easily seen to be a variation of the
widely used Park model (Park 1967; Kmenta 1986).
24
Weproceedbyobtaining consistentestimatesoftheelementsofV,
which in turn enables feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) esti-
mation of the model. The benefit of FGLS is that it produces coeffi-
cient estimates that are asymptotically efficient. However, Monte
Carlo analysis of the Park model by Beck and Katz (1995) suggests
that FGLS may produce standard errors that are substantially
downwardlybiasedinfinitesamples.Incontrast,theyreportthatOLS
standarderrors,appropriatelycorrectedforV,arelikelytobemorere-
liable. As a result, we report both OLS with corrected standard errors
and FGLS results.
Table 6 reports the results of reestimating equation (2), first using
OLS where the standard errors are corrected for the error structure of
equation(3),thenusingFGLS.
25Referringtorows1and2ofTable6,
we see that the corrected standard errors are approximately three
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.times larger than the biased standard errors produced by OLS. Virtu-
ally all of this bias can be attributed to the allowance for within-state
correlation. This result is similar to that reported by Moulton (1990)
and virtually identical to Duggan (2000), who performs an empirical
analysis conceptually similar to ours.
Despite the dramatic change in the size of the standard errors, the
conclusions fromtheoriginal OLSanalysisremainthesame:Theco-
efficient for the dummy variable designed to capture unaccounted,
regionwide growth during 1994-1997 (POST93) is still significant at
the1%level.Thecoefficientforthedummyvariabledesignedtomea-
sure New Jersey–specific growth during the tax cut years (TAXCUT)
is still insignificant, with associated p values now in the 60% range.
The FGLS results reported in rows 3 and 4 likewise support these
conclusions.
There remainsone more estimation concern. We concluded earlier
thatNewJersey’staxcutsweresubstantiallylargerandmorefrequent
than those of other states in the region, with the possible exception of
New York. We now want to allow for “the possible exception of New
York.” To do that, we construct a dummy variable, NY_DUMMY,
whichtakesthevalue1iftheobservationislocatedinthestateofNew
York and occurs in the time period 1994-1997. The resulting specifi-
cation is given by equation (4):
EMPGTit = αi + β TAXCUTit + γ POST93t + δ NY_DUMMYit + εit. (4)
Rows5through 8reporttheresultsofestimatingthisequationfirst
with OLS (with corrected standard errors), then with FGLS. The
NY_DUMMYcoefficient ishighly insignificant in eachof the four re-
gressions. Overall, the results concerning New Jersey’s economic
growth are little changed from above. (Although it is true that the
FGLScoefficientfortheTAXCUTcoefficientisestimatedtobelarger
when using the region defined by BEA Economic Areas 10 and 12
[row 8], the point estimateof 0.649 lies less than a standard deviation
[0.801] from zero and has an associated p value of .42.)
If we take the averages of the eight sets of coefficients reported in
Table 6, we see that approximately three fourths of New Jersey’s in-
creased economic growth in the 1994-1997 period was shared by
counties outside the state but within the same economic region. The
284 PUBLIC FINANCE REVIEWresidual growth specific to New Jersey was not statistically signifi-
cant: The p values associated with the TAXCUT coefficient were
larger than 40% in each of the eight regressions reported in Table 6.






Figure 2: Individual TAXCUT Estimates for Each of New Jersey’s 21 Counties
NOTE:Thisfigure representsestimated coefficientsof individual TAXCUT dummyvari-
ables for the respective counties. Estimates are obtained using the ordinary least
squares (OLS) model of equation (3) with TAXCUT dummy variables for each of New
Jersey’s 21 counties.As a final check for any tax cut effects, we specify the OLS model
of equation (2) with individual TAXCUT dummy variables for New
Jersey’s 21 counties. This specification allows us to estimate a sepa-
ratetaxcuteffectforeachNewJerseycounty.Although wedonotre-





all of the respective TAXCUT coefficients are equal to zero.
To summarize, our analysis set out to determine whether employ-
ment growth in New Jersey during 1994-1997 differed from employ-
mentgrowthinotherareaswithinthesameeconomicregion.Ourcon-
clusion—robust across a wide variety of estimation procedures—is
that it did not. Although New Jersey experienced strong growth dur-
ing this period, so did the economies of the neighboring Economic
Areas.
Analternativeinterpretation ofour resultsisthatperhapsNewJer-
sey’s tax cuts were effective in stimulating employment growth and
that this growth “radiated” outward, stimulating growth in neighbor-
ing Economic Areas. This interpretation could also explain why we
do not observe much difference between New Jersey and the
surrounding Economic Areas.
If the alternative explanation were valid, however, one would ex-
pect to see the difference decreasing as one moved closer to New Jer-
sey.Accordingly,theTAXCUTcoefficientshouldbesmallerwhenus-
ing BEA Economic Areas 10 and 12 (those that directly include New
Jersey)thanwhenusingBEAEconomicAreas10through14.Infact,
theopposite istrue.Acomparison oftheodd rowswiththeevenrows
inTable6showsthattheemploymentgrowthdifferencebetweenNew
Jersey and its surrounding area gets larger, not smaller, when one re-
stricts the analysis to the counties from Economic Areas that are
closest to New Jersey.
Finally,apotentialcriticismofourstudyisthatitadoptstheframe-
workofa“naturalexperiment”andassumesthatNewJersey’staxcuts
can be modeled as an exogenous experiment in state policy. In fact,
however, to the extent that this criticism is valid, it only strengthens
our conclusion. A positive correlation between economic growth and
286 PUBLIC FINANCE REVIEWthe adoption and continuance of New Jersey’s tax cut program would
cause the TAXCUT coefficient to be positively biased. This would
makeit morelikely that wewould find the residual growth specificto
New Jersey to be statistically significant. The fact that we do not find
statisticalsignificance,even given apossible positivebias, makesour
empirical findings even stronger.
CONCLUSION
New Jersey has two characteristics that make it an interesting case
study for analyzing the impact of a large, state-level personal income
tax cut. First, it can be argued that the 1994-1996 New Jersey tax cuts
weredrivenbyfactorsexogenoustothestateeconomy(i.e.,theWhit-
man effect), making it a good candidate for a “natural experiment.”
Second, it is a state that is frequently identified as a “role model” for
policy makers contemplating tax cuts for their states.
Although NewJerseyexperiencedsubstantialemploymentgrowth
during the period 1994-1997, we conclude that most of this growth
cannot be attributed to the tax cuts. Robust employment growth dur-
ing this period was not unique to New Jersey. It is important to note,
however,thatouranalysisisconcernedwithmeasuringtheshort-term
impact of state-level tax policy. We do not address the issue of long-
term impact, which raises a different set of econometric and
specification issues.
Anadditional contribution ofthisstudy isthatitintroduces anum-
ber of empirical innovations in its study of state tax policy. It demon-
strates the benefits of using county-level data while also identifying
the econometric issues that arise when the analysis of state policies is
moved to the county level. Furthermore, it highlights the role that
BEAEconomicAreascanplayincontrollingforunobservedregional
shocks. The potential impact of spatial autocorrelation may also be
important, though we leave this to future research.
As for the general question of the benefits of cutting taxes, we be-
lievethatthemainlessonsfromour analysisoftheNewJerseymodel
do not provide support for those who promote tax-cutting policies to
stimulate growth. However, we also find no evidence to indicate that
Reed, Rogers / TAX CUTS, EMPLOYMENT GROWTH IN NEW JERSEY 287the Whitman tax cuts hurt economic growth. This reinforces the gen-
eral consensus among academics that the primary focus of state-level
tax and expenditure debates should be the relative merits of public
versus private spending and not the impact of these policies on short-
run aggregate economic activity.
NOTES
1. Asimilarconclusionhasbeenfoundintheempiricalliteratureaddressingthemoregen-
eral relationship between government activities and economic growth (Poot 2000).
2. Incontrast,MillerandRussek(1997)findanegativerelationshipbetweentaxesandeco-
nomic growth, even when tax revenues are used to finance public services.
3. Wasylenko (1997,38) characterizes the results as “not very reliable,” and Bartik (1997,
67)suggeststhattheresultsare“quitefragile.” McGuire(1992,458)concludes“thattheeffects
of state and local tax policy are so uncertain that concern over this issue should not be a driving




and Case (2000)discuss necessary conditionsfor a policy variable to be employed as an exoge-
nous explanatory variable in cross-sectional analyses of policy incidence.
5. This is the approach suggested byBartik (1997).
6. ThepoliticalaffiliationsofthegovernorsarelistedinAmericanPoliticalLeaders,1789-
2000 (Congressional Quarterly, Inc. 2000). Whitman was elected governor of New Jersey in
1993.
7. AccordingtoNelson(2000),theimpositionoftaxpolicychangesduringthefirstyearof
a governor’s term is not unusual.
8. In fact, “RepublicanChristie Whitman . . . had made oppositionto [Democraticincum-
bent governor] Florio’s tax policies the hallmark of her dramatic run against [Senator] Bill
Bradley in 1990” (Mullaney 1994, 267).
9. The Mideast region, as defined by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), includes
Delaware,Maryland,NewJersey,NewYork,andPennsylvania.AlthoughtheDistrictofColum-
bia is also included, we restrict our discussion to the five states.
10. The National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) State Tax Actions provides
yearly summaries of legislative actions taken by states and estimates of corresponding revenue
impacts.AlloftheMideaststateslegislatedchangesinvariousdifferenttaxesduringtheperiod.
A summary is available from the authors by request.
11. The New York figures are misleading in this calculation due to the implementation of
healthcareprovidertaxesthatmaybepartiallyorevencompletelyreturnedtoprovidersthrough
theMedicaidleveragingschemes.SeeReedandRogers(2000)foradiscussionofmeasurement
errors associated with Medicaid schemes and other idiosyncrasies associated with cross-state
revenue comparisons.
12. TheNCSLclassifiestaxchangesasmajoriftheyareatleast1%ofstatetaxrevenuesin
the previous fiscal year.
288 PUBLIC FINANCE REVIEW13. Taxliabilitymeasuresofthesizeoftaxchangesarenotavailableforyearspriorto1994.
14. Surveys of event studies in economics and finance are given by MacKinlay (1997) and
Lamdin (2001).
15. EmploymentdataarefromtheRegionalEconomicInformationSystems1969-1997se-
ries, produced by the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
16. The simple model includes a constant, a dummy variable taking the value 1 during the
years 1994-1997, and the usual assumptions concerning the error terms.
17. TheestimationequationisEMGTit=αi+βPOST93t+εit,εit~N(0,σ),i=1,2,...,21,t=
1989, 1990, . . ., 1997, andPOST93t = 1 if t > 1993.
18. For example, Carlino and DeFina (1998) show that U.S. regions have differential re-
sponses to unexpected monetary policy changes.
19. ThetotalnumberofobservationsisN×T,whereTisthenumberofyearsinthepanel.
20. Of course, representing tax changes with a series of dummy variables raises concerns
that the dummy variables measure the influence of factors other than the tax changes.
21. NotefromTable1thatthe1994NewJerseytaxcutswereeffectiveretroactively,sothat
they had revenue impacts during the same fiscal year in which they were adopted.
22. For example, the estimated sizes of New Jersey’s tax cuts reported in Table 2, obtained
fromNCSLStateTaxActionpublications,differsubstantiallyfromthosereportedinTable1,
obtained from the Office of Tax Analysis, Department of Treasury, State of New Jersey (1998).
Variousfactorscausethedeviationsinestimates.TheNCSLestimatesareobtainedfromsurveys
oflegislativestaff,whichinquireaboutmajorlegislativeactionsintheyearbasedontheprevious
year’s revenues. The tax office uses the current-year revenue estimates and includes all tax law
changes affecting revenue during the year.
23. AnotherissueconcernsthepotentialeffectsofspilloversfromNewJerseytaxcutstothe
neighboring counties or in the opposite direction. Following yardstick competition models, the
New Jersey tax cuts may have played a role in instigating the subsequent tax changes in New
YorkandPennsylvania.Thiswouldcausetheestimatesofthetaxcutimpactsusingtheregional




phia to New Jersey counties would bias estimated impacts upward when using the Mideast
region in the analysis.
24. This specification can be rewritten as YX tt t =+ + ββ µ 01 , where µρ µ ε tt t =+ −1 .
Substituting for µt and solving gives YX Y X tt t t t =− + + − + −− () βρ β β ρ ρ β ε 00 1 11 1 . Thus,
our specification is tantamount to estimating Yt using a lagged dependent variable.
25. The SAS/IML program used to generate the estimates in Table 6 is available from the
authors upon request.
26. The regression underlying these estimates used counties from Economic Areas 10
through 14.
REFERENCES
Bartik, Timothy J. 1991. Who benefits from state and local economic development policies?
Kalamazoo, MI: W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
Reed, Rogers / TAX CUTS, EMPLOYMENT GROWTH IN NEW JERSEY 289.1997.DiscussionofWasylenko’sandFisher’sreviews.NewEnglandEconomicReview,
March-April, 67-71.
Beck, Nathaniel, and Jonathan Katz. 1995. What to do (and not to do) with time-series cross-
section data. American Political Science Review 89:634-47.
Becsi, Zolt. 1996.Do state andlocal taxes affect relative state growth? Federal Reserve Bankof
Atlanta Economic Review 81:18-36.
Besley, Timothy, and Anne Case. 1995. Incumbent behavior: Vote-seeking, tax-setting, and
yardstick competition. American Economic Review 85:25-45.
. 2000. Unnatural experiments? Estimating the incidence of endogenous policies. Eco-
nomic Journal 110:672-94.
Carlino, Gerald A., and Robert F. DeFina. 1998. The differential regional effects of monetary
policy. Review of Economics and Statistics 80:572-87.
Carroll,Robert,andMichaelWasylenko.1994.Dostatebusinessclimatesstillmatter?Evidence
of a structural change. National Tax Journal 7:19-37.
Case,Anne.1993.InterstatetaxcompetitionafterTRA85.JournalofPolicyAnalysisandMan-
agement 12:136-48.
Congressional Quarterly, Inc. 2000. American political leaders, 1789-2000. Washington, DC:
Congressional Quarterly Press.
Duggan, Mark. 2000. More guns, more crime. NBER Working Paper Series, Working Paper
7967, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.
Garfield, Reed. 1996. Tax cuts and balanced budgets: A tour of Lansing and Trenton. Mimeo,
Joint Economic Committee Report.
Gold, Steven D. 1996. State tax cuts of 1995: Is something new afoot? Public Budgeting and
Finance 16:3-22.
Helms,L.Jay.1985.Theeffectofstateandlocaltaxesoneconomicgrowth:Atimeseries-cross
section analysis. Review of Economics and Statistics 67:574-82.
Johnson, Kenneth. 1995. Redefinition of the BEA economic areas. Survey of Current Business
75:75-81.
Kmenta, Jan. 1986. Elements of econometrics. 2nd ed. New York: Macmillan.
Lamdin, Douglas J. 2001. Implementing and interpreting event studies of regulatory changes.





McGuire, Therese. 1992.Review of “Who benefits fromstate and local economicdevelopment
policies?” National Tax Journal 45:457-59.
Miller, Stephen M., and Frank S. Russek. 1997. Fiscal structures and economic growth at the
state and local level. Public Finance Review 25:213-37.
Mofidi, Alaeddin, and Joe A. Stone. 1990. Do state and local taxes affect economic growth?
Review of Economics and Statistics 72:686-91.
Moore, Stephen, and Dean Stansel. 1996. Tax cuts and balanced budgets: Lessons from the
states. Cato Fact Sheet, Cato Institute, Washington, DC.
Moulton, Brent R. 1990. An illustration of a pitfall in estimating the effects of aggregate vari-
ables on micro units. Review of Economics and Statistics 72:334-38.
Mullaney, Marie Marmo. 1994. Biographical directory of the governors of the United States,
1988-1994. Westport, CT: Meckler.
Nelson, Michael A. 2000. Electoral cycles and the politics of state tax policy. Public Finance
Review 28:540-60.
290 PUBLIC FINANCE REVIEWOfficeofTaxAnalysis,DepartmentofTreasury,StateofNewJersey.1998.GovernorWhitman’s
major tax reductions: FY94-FY99 ($M). Mimeo.




ment: A meta-analysis. Southern Economic Journal 62:320-33.
Poot,Jacques.2000.Asynthesisofempiricalresearchontheimpactofgovernmentonlong-run
growth. Growth and Change 31:516-46.
Reed,RobertW.,andCynthiaL.Rogers.2000.Measurementerrorandendogeneityinstudiesof
state tax policy and economic growth. Mimeo, University of Oklahoma.
Tannenwald, Robert. 1996.State business tax climate: How should it be measured and how im-
portant is it? New England Economic Review, January-February, 23-38.
Wasylenko, Michael.1997.Taxationandeconomicdevelopment:The state of the economiclit-
erature. New England Economic Review, March-April, 37-52.
W. Robert Reed is a professor in the Department of Economics at the University of
Oklahoma, Norman.
CynthiaL. Rogers is anassociateprofessor in the Departmentof Economicsat the Uni-
versity of Oklahoma, Norman.
Reed, Rogers / TAX CUTS, EMPLOYMENT GROWTH IN NEW JERSEY 291